

# THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY: A CASE STUDY OF ISSUES OF KOSOVO FROM 1998 TO 1999

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## Abstract

The paper in itself involves International insistence in all aspects in solving Kosovo issue within the framework of Yugoslavia-Serbia and the various attempts of Albanian people, who do not allow something like this to happen at all. In the beginning, politic alternative of Kosovo attempted for years in achieving its political rights with politic means, peaceful policy, known as political Doctrine of Ibrahim Rugova, and Democratic League of Kosovo respectively, which by time as estimated by all, was accepted that with such, policy may be able to achieve what the people of Kosovo was determined in achieving for centuries. In this paper, I documented that the Kosovo case was completely ignored in International Conference during the entire period before the presentation of KLA (Liberation Army of Kosovo). After the signing of Agreement of Dayton in 1995, the situation in Kosovo became worsened. Kosovan Albanians looked behind their shoulders and learnt that Bosnians, Croatians, Slovenians, and Macedonians got separated from Yugoslavia and created independent countries, whereas Kosovan Leadership still continued with the call for endurance by proclaiming peaceful policy and still not understanding that International Diplomacy was compelled to evolve contrary with their historical determinations to preserve Yugoslavia by all means. Albanian people understood this idea on time and as a result, KLA came to surface an enabled International Diplomacy in general and American Diplomacy in particular to incorporate the solution of Kosovo issue within the mosaic of status solving, as it was done to other Republics in former Yugoslavia.

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**Keywords:** Kosovo, international diplomacy, Kosovo liberation army

## Introduction

In this paper, I started with the introduction of a brief history of International Diplomacy of Kosovo issue until 1998, which I believe reflects the best the role and impact of the Kosovo Liberation Army, not only in the political scene in Kosovo, but also in International Diplomacy.

Warren Zimmermann, the last former U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia, concluded that Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top to the bottom. Therefore, in his opinion, the catastrophe faced by Yugoslavia did not come as a result of old ethnicity or religion hostilities, or the collapse of communism at the end of the Cold War, and not even the failure of the policy of western countries. There is no doubt that these factors have worsened the situations of things, but the death of Yugoslavian's and the violence are the results of conscious actions of nationalist leadership.<sup>2</sup> Since World War II, Yugoslavia was the first country to be destroyed, and very soon, the next will be that of Soviet Union. According to his evaluations, this case were different and does not have anything in common, of which I considered it not to be his professional analysis but was rather based on the assessment of their diplomatic strategy. According to Warren Zimmermann, the Soviet Union is a

centralized dictatorship, an ideological tyranny, and a despotism exercised by a single ethnic group and a Colonial Empire, but Yugoslavia was another different case.

Consequently, according to Warren Zimmermann, what he assumes was the opinion of the Official American Diplomacy, thus if the Soviet Union deserved to fall apart, there was less moral reasons for Yugoslavia to suffer such fate.

Such determination and assessment shows in itself the commitment and tactics Kosovo alternative policy had to change the view of the West in general and, particularly that of America, about the importance of Yugoslavia in the International Political scene. Yugoslavia <sup>78</sup>would remain united<sup>4</sup>. Old Bush Administration, towards the end of his governing mandate, believed that Yugoslavia must be united, at least for as long as this unity can be achieved through democratic means. Even at this stage of determining the preservation of Yugoslavia, the U.S. supported Kosovo, but only in terms of achieving the "rights and freedoms according to international standards."

But on this ground, it was identified that it was impossible; hence, this was best illustrated by the former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann who described a meeting with an intellectual Serbian art historian lady, who had lived very long in America, and her question to the U.S. Ambassador, 'how he would handle the problem of Kosovo'? Therefore, the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade responds with the words: "It's so simple, *"I will line up Albanians against the wall and shoot them all to the last one."*

Neither this chauvinist criminal mindset of a Serbian intellectual, which almost expressed the opinion of majority of the Serbian people did not help the American Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. Warren Zimmerman and the U.S. Diplomacy and International to understand that the case of Kosovo was not only an issue of human rights and freedom.

### **Kosovo Crisis**

The Kosovo crisis has split the International community. International action in relation to Kosovo has prompted a fierce debate among governments and observers of international politics; whereas others might have understood the international response to Kosovo as an example of the return of the classic policy of the XIX century, others have considered that a new form of the collapse of the classical system dominated by self-interest state policies was emerging.

This commitment of America was difficult because Russia implemented the strategy of maintaining and strengthening the influence and prestige of the European continent, in its attempts to be re-considered as the Major World Power. Therefore, while adhering to its geopolitical interests, Moscow wanted at all costs to preserve and protect Serbia loyal ally. Other European countries, particularly the main ones which are Great Britain and France, tended toward their historical alliances with Serbia since World War II.

### **Efforts of International Diplomacy to Preserve Yugoslavia**

Regardless of all violent acts which Serbia had committed to rule in Yugoslavia, the American diplomacy was engaged in maintaining the stability of international relations, but with a low intensity for the preservation of SFRY. Thus, this action could be spotted with last former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Mr. Warren Zimmermann, who in his first visit to Kosovo in June 1989, carried an exceeded political-diplomatic definition of the U.S. that "

<sup>78</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastropher Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.introduction

<sup>2</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastropher Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.introduction

<sup>3</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastropher Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.introduction

<sup>4</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastropher Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page..140

Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastropher Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.introduction

<sup>6</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastropher Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.introduction

U.S. policy didn't bring to doubt Serbian Sovereignty over Kosovo ..." During his visit, he made attempts to convince the political leadership of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, to take part in Serbian Elections of 1990, justifying his proposal, of "him threatening" with words. Otherwise, the <sup>79</sup>rejection of Serbian Elections will not help his credibility as a Democrat, and in this case, he mentioned the Irish experiences in the nineteenth century in Britain's House of Commons and the House of Deputies Algerians in France in 1950. In his book quoted in this paper, the U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, stated how that Ibrahim Rugova warmly smiled to his proposal as he usually did and would not concede at any point in time. Furthermore, he made it clear to the Ambassador that he will not stay even one day as Albanian Leader in case such steps is been undertaken. Rugova told the U.S. Ambassador that "Kosovo Albanians will never accept Serbian Authority,"<sup>11</sup>, thus, the U.S. Ambassador stressed out that Ibrahim Rugova is "one of the most prominent political figures he has met in Yugoslavia."

During the time American Diplomacy understood that their political desire for the preservation of Yugoslavia was impossible and that the peaceful designation of Kosovo and their patience does not respond to violence with violence, thus they began to gain sympathy and support from the state, which was considered as the cradle of Global Democracy, America, at least in the field of human rights and freedoms. On Christmas Day in 1992, the Bush Administration (the Elders), which generally had been passive in the Balkans, with diplomats from the United States, told Milosevic (Serbian President), that the United States would militarily retaliate if the Serbs would start any armed conflict in Kosovo<sup>12</sup>. Therefore, three weeks after President Clinton came into power in 1993, the Secretary to the State, Christopher again emphasized the "Christmas Warning"<sup>13</sup>.

Controversies in efforts of developing a foreign policy through the U.S. Congress Resolutions and Amendments culminated in the so-called Nickel's Amendment, which was adopted in November 1990 and entered into force after six months, and thus, this Amendment became a law over the entire opposition of the Bush Administration in order to stop the economic aid to Yugoslavia until Serbia will stop with violation of human rights in Kosovo. "The U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, also considered that this approach of U.S. Senators on the Kosovo issue complicated the efforts in finding a peaceful and democratic way to the Kosovo Crisis. Thus, relying on such reason, he had tried several times through the telephone to explain to senators who supported Kosovo, especially Robert Dole and Nickels, to explain why their engagement would bring the opposite results of what they expected. In an attempt to talk with Senator Dole about this issue, a staff member had told him that Senator Dole is saying that why "this Ambassador has not interrupted calling the senators on the phone, but has instead stick to what he is paid for?"<sup>15</sup>.

### **First Conference of the European Council held on "Yugoslav Issue"**

For the first time, a Conference of Yugoslavia was held by the EC on September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1991 in Hague, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. The conference was mandated to ensure peaceful accommodation of the conflicting aspirations of the people of Yugoslavia, based on the following principles:

- There is no unilateral change of borders by force<sup>80</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastrophe Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.introduction page.18

<sup>8</sup>Weller Marc "Contentious Citizenship Koha – Prishtinë 2009. page.33

<sup>9</sup>Weller Marc "Contentious Citizenship Koha – Prishtinë 2009. page.34

<sup>79</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastrophe Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. page.78

<sup>79</sup> Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastrophe Printing House: Besa-Tiranë1996. Page. 80

<sup>12</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004 page. 443

- Protecting the rights of all in Yugoslavia
- Legitimate concerns and aspirations will be taken fully into account

At this Conference, the Kosovo issue was treated as if it does not exist at all. Practically, it didn't exist as an International problem, because, according to political pronouncements LD, it was treated as a problem of violations of human rights and freedoms, and so was it treated by the International community at the meetings.

The international community was mainly focused to appease Serbia in relation to Serbs in Croatia and elsewhere. It was clear that the conference hoped that the guarantee of a regime for minorities and autonomy for Serbs would reduce opposition of Belgrade to the independence of Republics "<sup>17</sup>. As always, Serbia had rejected any proposal and therefore EC had offered recognition republics to those states that wanted independence, provided that the unilateral is to be subjected to some conditions, including in particular, the provisions on human rights and minority according to the proposed Carrington Plan. "<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, this had opened the way for recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia Statehood, but this decision was disastrous for Kosovo. Kosovo was denied the right of self-determination as well as other republics, which set the date for December 23, 1991 until Yugoslav Republics submit an application for their Independence. Arbitrarily, the Conference has denied this right or opportunity of Kosovo. Requests were officially submitted by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and "Kosovo has presented a letter addressed to Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, for recognition on a day before the deadline."<sup>20</sup> This fact proved that our political parties and parallel created institutions do not function as genuine state institutions and at the same time, had not formed groups of experts who were familiar with the international legal and diplomatic procedures. This case was supposed to make them understand that it is not enough that it was related to such serious matter, as the justified demand for independence or separation of a state is required only with a letter and addressed to inadequate addresses. An amateur spectrum which accesses the political aspect of Kosovo has continued to the end of its existence. Requirements for the said issue were received by the Arbitration Commission of the EC, headed by a French constitutional lawyer, Badinter. In understanding the letter, the petition from Pristina was not taken into consideration at all by Badinter Commission. Different Conferences and diplomatic meetings proceeded to resolve the Yugoslav Crisis. Such Conference was held on August 26 to 28, 1992 in London, where the Kosovo issue was ignored even though "Kosovo took part in the Conference, but was not present in the hall where the discussion was held in a room known as the " echo chamber ". Direct television broadcasting could be transmitted and here and then, Lord Carrington and other senior officials would visit the room and in an arrogant way as required by Rugova and his delegation. However, there was no any substantial commitment to the issue of Kosovo "<sup>21</sup>.

Fortunately, this conference also failed, as Serbian hegemonic appetites for the creation of a Greater Serbia again "saved" Kosovo. Thus, I affirmed that we survived, because if they would have accepted the recommendations of the current and later Conference, international diplomacy would certainly sacrifice the interests of the people of Kosovo.<sup>81</sup>

13 Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004 page. 443

14 Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastrophe Printing House: Besa-Tiranë 1996 page.129

15 Zimmermann Warren."Sources of one Catastrophe Printing House: Besa-Tiranë 1996. page.132

16 General Convention of Carrington for a long-period solution, October 18, 1991

17 Weller Marc "Contentious Citizenship Koha – Prishtinë 2009. Page .98

18 Weller Marc "Contentious Citizenship Koha – Prishtinë 2009. Page .99

19 Weller Marc "Contentious Citizenship Koha – Prishtinë 2009. page.100

20 Weller Marc "Contentious Citizenship Koha – Prishtinë 2009. page.100

At the Council Meeting held in Edinburgh on 12 December 1992, the EC stated that “the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia must be restored”, by indicating to Kosovo Albanian leadership, that their wider interest will not be represented in the context led by the EU.

European Diplomacy runs in the CSCE framework, but OSCE was more concerned of the risk of the wide spread of instability from Kosovo to Macedonia, which would include, Greece and possibly Turkey, which results in the implementation of the so-called preventive diplomacy. OSCE began its Mission in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina on September 8, 1992 and remained there until June 1993, when Belgrade had withdrawn the consent made to this Mission, as the CSCE arrived at a decision that crippled Yugoslavia should be suspended from participation in the duty of this International Organization.

"After the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the situation in Kosovo began to get more difficult. Kosovo Albanians were aware of Bosnians, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians experiences who had split from Yugoslavia and had created their independent states, but whereas, their political leadership still continued with the call for patience."<sup>23</sup>

### **Action of International Diplomacy toward the issue of Kosovo**

International Diplomacy was stereotype, slow and not unique. Everyone knew that Serbia under Milosevic's leadership is making terror of genocide proportions against the Albanian people in Kosovo, but this was still reluctantly admitted publicly as they were aware that if the international democratic public would understand the truth of what was happening in Kosovo, then their governments would be required to undertake serious steps in preventing this tragedy. Furthermore, the visit of the German Foreign Minister to Albania on 6 February 1998 with regards to the issue of Kosovo, stated: "We are concerned and Milosevic must understand that the situation there is being monitored closely, especially by the U.S. and Germany government. A Serbian minority in Kosovo cannot rule 90 % of Albanians there. Thus, we shall seek a political solution, as we are aware that Belgrade makes deceptive polity " <sup>24</sup>, but, Mr. Kinkel, after this meeting also in his conference held with reporters, did not hesitate to proclaim the diplomatic stands on Kosovo issue. At this press conference, he stated: "Related to Kosovo issue, we also have the same opinion for the issue of the Kurds, not separatism. We do not support Kosovo Independence. Kosovo unfortunately was not included in the Dayton Agreement, but we will try to do something, but we cannot interfere in the Internal Affairs of Kosovo, as we did not even support the separatist movement."<sup>21</sup>. France formulated this position as: either the existing status quo or independence, but a substantial autonomy. Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Hubert Vedrin , in a meeting with his Albanian counterpart , Paskal Milo, March 6 , 1998 in Paris, however expressed the position of French diplomacy on the issue of Kosovo as: " I want to confirm here the attitude of France toward Kosovo, which has to do with finding a formula of autonomy as it has existed , an autonomy with significant role, but in no way to think about independence". Strange stand about Kosovo was done by the Prime Minister of Albania, Mr. Fatos Nano, who during the meeting in Crans Montana but also expressed openly against the independence of Kosovo without being asked to do so".

### **Contact Group<sup>82</sup>**

The entire international fondling diplomacy, rather than appeasing Milosevic and Serbia, created a self-deception and self-esteem to the Serbs that they are really “celestial people” and that they are more powerful than the whole world. It was perhaps understandable

<sup>21</sup> Milo Paskal. Diary of a Foewreign Minister –Conflict of Kosovo 1997-2001. Toena-Tiranë 2009. page. 33

<sup>22</sup> Milo Paskal. Diary of a Foewreign Minister –Conflict of Kosovo 1997-2001. Toena-Tiranë 2009. page. 36

<sup>23</sup> Milo Paskal. Diary of a Foewreign Minister –Conflict of Kosovo 1997-2001. Toena-Tiranë 2009. page 75

<sup>24</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. page. 445

that after them, they were supported by almost the entire European diplomacy. This support of Serbia stands as an evidence from the Contact Group Meeting in London which was a transatlantic task force for the Balkans, comprising of the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. At this meeting led by Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Robin Cook, in which an effort was made to Serbia with the threat of applying sanctions if violence continues in Kosovo, after the speech of U.S. Secretary, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, who among others said: " Lancaster House, the magnificent building where we have gathered today, is the same building in which foreign ministers from Western countries had held so many fruitless sessions for Bosnia. From the beginning of the decade (the 90-s), the international community had underestimated the first signs of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Therefore, we should clearly bring out wrong lessons from such experience. Violence in Kosovo is new, but the problem created by Milosevic's ruthless ambition is not new. I have warned that the Kosovo issue will have repercussions throughout the Region; therefore, Serbs cannot be allowed to call it an internal matter of their own. KLA would not exist, unless the rights of Kosovans have not been denied, and also concrete measures should be taken, to enforce our authority over Belgrade. This is how we forced Milosevic to sit at Dayton table, and this is the only language Milosevic understands "<sup>24</sup>. These suggestions were supported only by the UK representative-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Robin Cook, others: French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, insisted that the sanctions should be postponed, condemned the commitment with the KLA and declare clearly our opposition to the independence of Kosovo. Also, Lamberto Dini of Italy, was concerned whether the sanctions applied against Milosevic should be reduced, instead of adding the willingness to cooperate and encourage us to discuss more thoroughly how to stop the smuggling of weapons to KLA. Yevgeny Primakov-who was against such meetings, in sign of protest, sent one of his deputies, who used blocking tactics and opposed any punitive measure against Serbia of Milosevic"<sup>25</sup>. Virtually, the same stands had the Contact Group in its Second Meeting held in March 25th in Bonn, Germany, as headed by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and as he himself says, Albright stated: "This meeting has convinced me that this group was not the proper organization to oppose Milosevic". Since its formation, the Contact Group claimed that the issue of Kosovo should and can be solved by balanced statements that will be adopted from time to time. Since the beginning, the majority of this group have perceived the problem of Kosovo as an internal matter of Yugoslavia. Therefore, these diplomatic dredging persuaded Madame Albright, that the role of America is not enough just to act as " part of the deal in Kosovo " , but America must lead this process. The U.S Administration also did not want to get involved into a new confrontation, which may require the use of force, nor was the Department of Defence, which had a compromise on the issue of maintaining U.S. troops in Bosnia, was willing to take into consideration the possibility of other missions in the Balkans. "Hence, as a result of this and my personal horror, the administration is not reaffirming the warnings of Christmas 1992 ".

### <sup>83</sup>**Warnings of U.S. Diplomacy**

This inert approach of Kosovo issue arising from most responsible levels of America, compelled Secretary of the State, Madeleine Albright to act and persuade or compel her subordinates to urgently discuss the possibility of bombing, which is the "Lack of a clear warning, which Milosevic would interpret as a green light to practice repression." With regard to this purpose, on April 23, 1999, Madeleine Albright, called Bob Gelbard and Strobe

<sup>25</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. page. 445

<sup>26</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. page.446

<sup>27</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. page. 446

<sup>28</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. page. 447

Talbot to discuss this issue with Bob Berger who "pointed out that the steps we were undertaking were not sufficient. Kosovo will go towards a confrontation of a large scale, if such political agreement is not achieved, which will not happen unless Milosevic is made to feel threatened, and he will not feel threatened until the use of coercion is applied primarily. Our stand at this time was that "nothing is excluded. This statement sounded weak; hence, Sandy Berger tried to intercept these discussions, and angrily asked: "How can you talk about bombing in the middle of Europe? What are the goals you want to score? What are you going to do the next day? It is an irresponsible action to proceed with threatening statements without a reasonable plan. From the way the State Department are talking about bombing, it seems that you are completely out of your minds!" However, the Secretary of the State, Albright, decisively stopped Berger, and said: "I cannot afford anymore! Whenever someone talks about the using force, personal attacks commence. Five years ago, when I proposed the use of force in Bosnia, Tony Lake did not let me bring my justification to an end, Now acting as the Secretary of the State, I am insisting that at least, we should sit and discuss this issue!:"<sup>29</sup>

### **Presentation of Kosovo Liberation Army**

The entire international and local approach toward the issue of Kosovo has not proved any productive results which the people of Kosovo has hoped for with full of patience and sacrifice. But logically, this vacuum between words and actions created the space for other progressive forces, but now, not political but military forces took the responsibility and leadership of Kosovo into their hands. Therefore, in this way, they have succeeded in making and compelling international diplomacy to think and act differently; but until then with conferences, the resolution submissions, complaints, suggestions, demands and requests are without any positive results. This force was presented to the public as the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA. The beginning of organizing of the first cells of KLA was extremely difficult which also carried its own price, but its growth didn't stop, and the sons and daughters of Kosovo and other ethnic territories had willingly joined. And so from a guerrilla cell, the KLA was raised in a military force that would protect people from Serbian genocide. Seeing this, the Serbian forces launched a powerful offensive in Drenica, precisely in the village of Vojnik, the family of the Commander - Abedin Rexha, called Sandokani. KLA forces under the direction of legendary Commander Adem Jashari, destroyed the Serbian military machinery, who shamefully retreated and fled Drenica. Serb forces during the withdrawal as a sign of revenge, killed a teacher, Halit Geci in the village of Llausha, and severely injured one pupil. Therefore, at the funeral of the teachers, Halit Geci, in November 28, 1997, KLA appeared for the first time in public<sup>34</sup> (Rexhep Selimi, Muje Krasniqi and Daut Haradinaj).<sup>34</sup> Then after the defeat of December 30, 1997 and January 22, 1998, military machinery of the state police begun with preparations for a large-scale police and military attack, with the sole purpose of killing the Commander of the first cells of KL, Adem Jashari, his brothers and his friends. This attack will begin in the early morning of March 5, 1998. This time, large military forces and police surrounded Prekaz, which is the main target of Jashari's

<sup>33</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. fq. 447

<sup>34</sup> Dreshaj Sylë. Genral Movment of Albanians in war to Independency in Kosovo Dukagjini-Pejë 2002. page. 23

<sup>35</sup> Dreshaj Sylë. Genral Movment of Albanians in war to Independency in Kosovo Dukagjini-Pejë 2002. page. 32

<sup>36</sup> Malcolm Noel. Kosovo one Short History. Koha-Prishtinë& Shtëpia e Librit-Tiranë. 2001. page. 303, 304

<sup>37</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. . 444

<sup>38</sup> Albright Madeleine. Lady Secretary .autobiography, Printing House: Dudaj-Tiranë 2004. page. 443

Malcolm Noel. Kosovo one Short History. Koha-Prishtinë& Shtëpia e Librit-Tiranë. 2001. page. 303, 304

<sup>40</sup> Milo Paskal. Diary of a Foeweign Minister –Conflict of Kosovo 1997-2001. Toena-Tiranë 2009.. page. 74

neighbourhood. The fight for the elimination of the Jashari was strict. The enemy deployed iron besiege in Prekaz and they attacked from different angles, firing with different kinds of weapons, but they encountered the commitment and extremely strong resistance, as if they were struggling with a whole army of professional and not just a few people. After a long and heroic resistance, the enemy managed to set the fire and destroy the Jashari neighbourhood. Adem Jashari with his brother Hamza, father Shaban and others fought to death, *The War of Adem Jashari was a general call to the people of Kosovo, and one could not indefinitely escape the war as imposed by a ruthless invaders. At the same time, this message was addressed to the international diplomacy that Kosovo people will pay any price to be liberated from Serbia.* Such a message of its own Commander was accepted almost by all the people of Kosovo, as well as the International Community. Particularly, the United States realized that it is impossible for Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia or any co-federal creature, named Yugoslavia and the presentation of KLA forced the international community to understand that the problem of Kosovo is not only a problem of rights and freedoms but much more.

Serious problem that could destabilize the entire Balkans which the entire Europe feared Massacre of Prekazi as emphasized by the Secretary of State of the United States herself, Ms. Madeleine Albright, "raised" the commitment "to fight the fascism of Milosevic.. In this regard, Mrs. Albright noted that during the said period "in the face of crisis, we had constantly pressed the Serb leaders not to launch a new wave of repressions, while reminding them of the Christmas Warning (not to attack Kosovo militarily as the America will counterfight)." <sup>37</sup> We wanted to convince moderated Albanians, while promoting the dialogue with Belgrade, which is aimed at restoring the Autonomy for Kosovo". Perhaps, for this purpose, the top U.S. interlocutor in the Balkans, Ambassador Robert Gelbard denounced the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA as a "terrorist group" ( 23 Feb. 1998 ). But several months later, in June 1998, the State Department said the U.S. through the spokesman, James Rubin stated "that Americans had not even considered or not considered KLA as terrorist"<sup>39</sup>. This statement for those who are updated with the policy of the most powerful countries, was a signal that something is changing in a positive and hopeful positive direction in solving the Kosovo issue. Thus, a small window which allows for the final solution of the Kosovo status to be different than it was proclaimed by the said day is opening in American diplomacy.

In conclusion, if Kosovo Liberation Army did not appear in public, Kosovo would not be independent and also international diplomacy in general and the U.S. in particular would not act as it had acted on the resolution of Kosovo issue.<sup>85</sup>

## Conclusion

- In all the process of solving of Kosovo issue, International Diplomacy was preserving of Yugoslavia territorial integrity
- International Diplomacy attempted to solve the crises of Kosovo with peaceful means at any condition.
- Problems, such as Kosovo or Yugoslavia case, was proved that it could not be solved with conferences, resolutions or declarations.
- Relying on any political-diplomacy discussion (though tempted), none of the cases can be preliminary excluded.
- Presentation of KLA came in the most suitable and favorable time for Kosovo, right at the moment when the fall of communism and cold war was expected to happen.

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Zimmermann Warren."Burimet e një katastrofe" Shtëpia botuese Besa-Tiranë 1996. page. 79



- If it had come in the public earlier, there would have been ten times more casualties, and international diplomacy would have had more favorable access to Kosovo, and if it had come later when Yugoslavia would have strengthened its positions, International factor would not support Kosovo.
- Kosovo is the best evidence that diplomacy is the art of using possibilities and moments, as it was the case of Conference of Rambouillet.
- Serbian policy identified with its president, Millosheviq, was a good lesson of how to loose a century international diplomacy support and friendship
- Kissinger's quoting: "Diplomacy without force is like a symphony without musical instruments", was an explicit saying.

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